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Dear Geoff: 
Pursuant to the provisions of 24(j) R. Utah S. Ct., 
appellant provides the Court with significant and pertinent 
authorities as more fully set forth below. 
In Walvrun v. State, 336 S.E.2d 798, 803-804 (Geo. Dec. 
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in Harmer v. State, 700 P.2d 212 (Ok. 1985) which has general 
significance to footnote 3 at page 30 of Appellant's Brief. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintitf-Respondent, : Case No. 860327 
v* : 
FRANCIS PRESTON MITCHELL, : Priority No. 2 
Detenaant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly admit Patricia 
Tyrell's hypnotically refreshed testimony, where she merely 
remembered details of the event and the assailant, her 
prehypnosis statements consistently gave a generalized 
description, and procedural sateguards were followed during 
hypnosis to maximize the reliability of the testimony? 
2. Did the trial court propeny admit testimony ot a 
telephone conversation between the defendant and his friend in 
Miami in which detenaant confessed he had killed a man, wnere 
such conversation was inadvertently intercepted by an operator 
during tne rendition ot her employment in that capacity? 
STJVTgHBNT QF TBB CASE 
Defendant, Francis Preston Mitchell, was charged with 
criminal homicide, a first degree felony, in violation ot Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (Supp. 1984) (R. 3-5).1 
Defendant was convicted of criminal homicide in a jury 
trial held January lb, 1^86 through January 20, 1986, in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding (R. 792)• 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Daniels on February 1, 1986, to 
life in the Utah State Prison (R. 850, 8b4) . Detenaant filed a 
Motion for New Trial (R. 884-1110), which was denied (R. 1562). 
This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF FACTS PWf-ATTfg TO THE COMMISSION OF 
THE MPUPgRt 
At the time ot tne shooting incident, Greg Oliver, 
defendant's friend, lived in Wasatch Condominiums in Park City, 
Utah (Tr. Vol. 6 at 640). Greg's fatner, Brian Oliver, lived in 
a home at 1172 Woodside Avenue in Park City, Utah (Tr. Vol. 2 at 
lb^ -6!>) . 
On August 4, 15*84, the victim, Fred Duncan, and his 
fiance, Patricia Tyrell, were house guests of Brian Oliver at the 
Woodside Avenue home in Park City (Tyrell 3, 4-5). Duncan and 
Tyrell had come to Park City for vacation (Tyrell 4-5)• They had 
spent that day attending the Arts Festival in Park City and were 
watching television in the Oliver living room from approximately 
9:00 to 11:30 p.m. (Tyrell 6-7, 13-31). Brian was sick and had 
1
 "R." reters to the record on appeal. "Tr." refers to tne 
transcript of the trial by its given volume number. "Tyrell" 
rerers to the separate volume ot Patricia Tyrellfs trial 
testimony. "Ptl. Tr." refers to the volume labeled Partial 
Transcript. 
gone to bea early in his own bedroom at the front ot the house 
(Tyrell 7). 
At about the same time, the defendant was attending a 
concert at the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City with his sister (Kim 
Mitchell), Tom Greco, and some frienos (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26^-63; 
Vol. 6 at 626-28). Just after the concertf at about 10:00 p.m., 
he tried to call the Brian Oliver residence in Park City to warn 
his friend, Greg Oliver, that there was an arrest warrant about 
to be served on him and to get out ot town (Pt. Tr. 97; Tr. Vol. 
2 at 264, 265-66). Defendant had dirticulty with whomever he was 
speaking to and became quite agitated when they hung up on him 
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 265-66). When his friend, Tom Greco, who had 
overheard tne end ot tne conversation, asKed him wnat was wrong, 
he said he was tired of everyone butting into his personal 
business and "tucking" with him. (Ptl. Tr. 97; Tr. Vol. 2 at 
266-67, 291.) He appeared to Greco to be very upset about not 
being able to reach Greg or Brian Oliver and about tne call in 
general. His anxiousness got worse as the night progressed (Tr. 
Vol. 2 at 269) . Detenoant denied making tnis call and claims he 
asked Greco to call the Oliver home and leave the message (Tr. 
Vol. 6 at 632-33). 
Patricia Tyrell answered a call at tne Oliver home just 
after 10:00 p.m. (Tyrell 30). The caller identified himself as 
"Tom" and asKed to speak to Brian Oliver (Tyrell 8-9).2 When 
o 
Several witnesses testified that they either knew tne detenaant 
by the name "Tom White" or that he used both his real name, 
Preston Mitchell, and the "Tom White" alias (Tr. Vol. 3 at 330, 
341; Tyrell 10; Tr. Vol. 2 at 177, 246, 258). 
Tyrell told the caller that Brian was sleeping and tnat she did 
not want to disturb him# the caller became irate and swore at 
Tyrell (Tyrell 8) . Fred Duncan, seeing tnat Tyrell was having 
ditticulties with the call, took the phone from her and told the 
caller tnat Brian would not be disturbed. When the caller 
continued to swear over the phone, Duncan hung up on him. He 
removed the phone from tne receiver so tnat no furtner calls 
could come in, turned otf all the lights in the house, locked the 
doors, and returned with Tyrell to watch television wmxe lying 
on the living room tloor (Tyrell 8-12). 
Hank Verrone, a friend ot Brian Oliver, received a call 
in Park City from Tom Greco at 10:30 p.m. (Tyrell 30; Tr. Vol. 2 
at 2/z, 293). Greco said that he had been trying to reach Brian 
Oliver and that Fred [Duncan] had the phone otf the hook. He 
asicea Verrone to go to Brian's house and tell Fred to put tne 
phone back on the hook so he could contact Brian. Shortly 
tnerearter, Verrone went to Brian's house and delivered tne 
message to Duncan (Tyrell 12-13)• Duncan told Verrone tnat the 
phone was off the hook because he did not want Brian disturbed, 
and it was going to stay otf the hook (Ptl. Tr. 76-78; Tyrell 
li.) At trial, Greco admitted making tnis call, but testified 
that he did not tell Verrone that Duncan would not let him talk 
to Brian Oliver (Tr. Vol. 2 at 293). 
After the concert, the defendant, Greco, and Kim 
Mitchell lett the otner two women in their party at the Green 
Parrot, a private club in Salt Lake City (Tr. Vol. 2 at 267-68). 
Greco and Kim lett detenaant in tne parking lot ot defendant1s 
friend1s, Ralph Garner*s, downtown apartment complex at about 
10:45 p.m. and subsequently took a room at the Sheraton Hotel at 
detenaant's request (Tr. Vol. 2 at 268-69). At Garner's 
apartment, the defendant took a large amount of cash and a blue 
canvas bag containing a .45 caliber automatic pistol in its 
holster (Tr. Vol. 2 at 269-70; Vol. 6 at 636-38). Greco returned 
to the Sheraton (Tr. Vol. 2 at 271) , and the detenaant walked to 
the Hotel Utah (Tr. Vol. 6 at 639), where he took a cab to Greg 
Oliver's condominium in Park West (Tr. Vol. 3 at 411; Tr. Vol. 6 
at 640) . 
Between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., as Duncan and Tyrell were 
lying on the living room tloor of the Brian Oliver home, an armed 
gunman kicked down trie front door, burst into the living room, 
stepped to the victim, Fred Duncanf said "You bastard," and shot 
him once in the head (Tyrell 13-26, 31). Tyrell rolled towards 
the door and stood. The assailant passed her. At tnat time, she 
heard tne "pop" ot the gun, ran through tne open door, fell over 
the front porch railing, ran through the gate, and down the 
street (Tyrell 16-28). 
Tyrell ran approximately five houses down tne street 
and into a house with lights on. From there, the owner of the 
house helped her call the police, who arrived witnin five minutes 
(Tyrell 26-30). The otticers went to the Brian Oliver home with 
Tyrell. They tound the victim lying dead trom a gunshot wound to 
the head (Pti. Tr. 36-37; Tyrell 34). 
At about 2:00 a.m. on August 5, 1984, defendant called 
an acquaintance, Ray Forbush, who lived in the Park City area, 
and told him he had been in a car accident and was too 
intoxicated to drive. He asked Forbush to pick him up at the Red 
Pine Condominiums (Tr. Vol. 3 at 329-3J1.) When Forbush picked 
the defendant up, the defendant appeared wet, dirtyf disheveled 
and upset, forbush took the defendant to his home, where 
defendant called Ralph Garner and asked him to drive from Salt 
Lake City and pick him up (Tr. Vol. 3 at 331-336, 408-09.) 
Defendant also showered at the Forbush home (Tr. Vol. 3 at 337.) 
At 2:10 a.m., detenaant placed a collect call from 
Forbush's house to his friend, Sean Sears, in Miami, Florida 
(Ptl. Tr. 87-89, 91; Tr. Vol. 2 at 254; Vol. 3 at 3J6; . Jeanette 
Guffey, the AT&T operator who handled the call, while in the 
course ot her employment, overheard the beginnings ot their 
conversation while she was waiting for the release button she had 
pushed to "drop" the call to a private line. Detenaant had 
identitied himself to the operator as "Preston" and had told her 
the call was an emergency (Ptl. Tr. 89)• Atter Sears accepted 
the charges, the operator overheard Preston say there had been an 
accident, that someone had tried to rip him off, and he had 
killed them (Ptl. Tr. 92-93, 250-53). Ms. Gutfey later notitied 
tne authorities and told Park City Police Chiet Frank Bell ot the 
call (Ptl. Tr. 94). 
Greco had gone to Garner's apartment in Salt Lake City 
to check on the defendant (Tr. Vol. 3 at 274) and was there when 
the detenaant phoned Garner requesting that Garner come to Park 
City and pick him up. Greco rode with Garner to the Forbush 
home, arriving at approximately 3:00 a.m. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 2/8-79). 
The detenaant took Garner aside in the Forbusn garage and told 
Garner he had gone to Brian's house, there was a scuttle with 
Duncan, and the gun had gone off (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28U; Vol. 3 at 
4109 415). He told Garner he panicked, ran and dumped the gun in 
a pond (Tr. Vol. 3 at 411). On the return to Salt Lake City, tne 
defendant wore a robe belonging to the Forbushes (Tr. Vol. 3 at 
338; 374) , and discarded his soiled clothing in tne garbage 
dumpster at Garner's apartment complex in Salt Lake City (Tr. 
Vol. 2 at 282: Vol. 3 at 412). 
Within a few days ot the shooting, tne detendant paid 
Kari Garner, Ralph Garner's then girlfriend, to take him to Las 
Vegas (Tr. Vol. 3 at 374) • He carried a large amount ot cash 
with him (Tr. Vol. 3 at 379). During the trip to Las Vegas, 
detenaant told Kari that he had killed Duncan and that it was an 
accident or mix up (Tr. Vol. 3 at 380, 396-97). 
At trial, several witnesses testified tnat the 
defendant and Fred Duncan, the victim, disliked each other and 
that there was long-running animosity between the two. Greg 
Oliver described Duncan's and defendant's relationship as a 
"mutual hatred" (Tr. Vol. 6 at 778). Tyrell knew tnat Duncan 
disliked the defendant "immensely" (Tyrell 35-36). Brian Oliver 
had even asked the detendant not to come by his house while 
Duncan was there because he knew of the animosity defendant and 
Duncan telt for each otner (Tr. Vol. 2 at lb7-68). Greco also 
testified that there were always bad feelings between the 
detenaant and Duncan (Tr. Vol. 2 at 2b0-61, 288) . 
Several witnesses testified that the defendant had two 
.45 caliber automatic or semi-automatic weapons prior to the 
murder and kept several guns at his house in Park Meadows (Tr. 
Vol. 224, 168-69, 250, 260-61). 
Ray Forbush and his wite, Debra, were both called by 
the State to testify. After defendant told Ray he was in a car 
accident, Ray drove to tne alleged accident scene and found no 
sign of an accident (Tr. Vol. 3 at 337-38). Ray and his wife 
also helped Ralph Garner and Kim Mitchell remove defendant's 
personal belongings, including his gun collection, from his 
rented house in Park Meadows on August 5 and 6, 1984 (Tr. Vol. 3 
at 339-344). Both Ray and Debra Forbush testitied tnat defendant 
was wearing slacks, a shirt, and shoes (not boots) at the time 
they saw him (Tr. Vol. 3 345-350, 355). 
Ralph Garner testified that the detenaant asKed him to 
look for the blue canvas bag near the old high school the day 
atter the shooting (Tr. Vol. 3 at 413; . He further testified 
that, while he and Kari were in Las Vegas with the defendant, 
detenaant admitted shooting Duncan, but said it was an accident 
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 415). Defendant told Garner he was afraid to turn 
himself in because he was atraid no one would believe it was an 
accident (Tr. Vol. 3 at 416)• Garner also testified tnat he had 
had several drug dealings with the detenaant in the previous two 
years, the last one on August 5, 1984, the day after the shooting 
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 406). 
During the investigation, the police recovered tne gun 
from a pond at the Park City Golf Course (Tr. Vol. 2 at 187-88, 
322-24) . This gun matched a casing found on the floor near the 
victim at the Oliver home (Tr. Vol. 2 at 203-210)• Tests on the 
spent shell found in the pillow near the victim's head were 
inconclusive (Tr. Vol. 2 at 209-10, 237-39). The blue canvas 
bag, with a holster for a .45 caliber automatic inside, was found 
in some weeds near the high school (Tr. Vol. 2 at 230-35). 
Defendant tooK the stand and testified in his own 
behalf (Tr. Vol. 6 at 618-750). He claims that Tom Greco made 
the call from the pay phone near the Salt Palace to tne Oliver 
home at 10:00 p.m. (Tr. Vol. 6 at 632-33). Greco denies making 
tnis calif but testified that he did overhear defendant make tne 
call (Tr. Vol. 2 at 293). Defendant indicated he was concerned 
for the satety ot his friena, Greg Oliverf who had had a bad drug 
deal with one Mike Shane, who was tnreatening Greg with impending 
bodily harm (Tr. Vol. 6 at 620-21) . When defendant could not 
reach Greg, either at his condo or his father's house, or his 
fatner, Brian, he went to Park City to warn Greg or his fatner 
that Greg should get out of town (Tr. Vol. 6 at 633-35). 
Defendant claims Greco gave him the blue canvas bag containing 
the loaded .45 caliber gun and holster (Tr. Vol. 6 at 636-38). 
Defendant asserted that, as he approached Brian 
Oliver's house, he thought it unusual that Brian, who was usually 
a late-night entertainer on weekends, had all his lights out (Tr. 
Vol. 6 at 641). Feeling that foul play had already occurred or 
was occurring in the house, he looked in Brian's bedroom window 
and saw who he thought to be Brian lying on the bed (Tr. Vol. 6 
at 646-47) . His anxiety increased when he could not wake Brian 
by knocking on the bedroom windows (Tr. Vol. 6 at 647) . He moved 
to the living room window and, looking in, saw two prone figures 
lying on the floor in front ot the television. He says, at tne 
time, he thought they were hiding (Tr. Vol. 6 at 649-51). He 
claims he thought he saw a movement in the dining area (Tr. Vol. 
6 at 653). Fearing the worst, he kicked in the door and moved 
toward tne dining area. As he did so, something caught him at 
the knees, he fell on top of Duncan, and the gun discharged, 
striking Duncan in the head, killing him (Tr. Vol. 6 at 621-654-
58). He said he panicked and ran through the fields and forest 
to Red Pines Condominiums in Park West, where he called Ray 
Forbush to pick him up. He testitied tnat he tnrew the blue bag 
containing tne holster in some bushes and tne gun in some water 
somewhere along the way (Tr. Vol. 6 at 659-563). Defendant was 
apprehended in October, 198b, some fourteen montns later, in 
Springfield, Missouri, by an F.B.I, agent. 
FACTS RELATING TO TTRELL'S TESTIMONY AMD DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 
During the last minutes ot August 4, 1984, and eany 
hours of August 5, 1984, just after Tyrell had witnessed the 
shooting ot her fiance, she gave a description ot the gunman to 
police orticers investigating the crime (R. 1277-78). She told 
Otticer Kip Ingersoll the assailant was a tail male, wearing dark 
clothes, possibly shorts, who carried a small black handgun (Ptl. 
Tr. 36,43). Later at the Park City clinic, she told Chier Bell 
she saw a male, approximately six feet tall, medium build, 
wearing dark clothing, and carrying a smooth flat pistol like 
what she had seen and knew to be an automatic (Ptl. Tr. 59). 
Chief Bell interviewed Tyrell again in his office on 
August 6, 1*84, just two days after.the murder (R. 542-99). 
Tyrell described the gunman as dressed all in black, wearing long 
pants, carrying a black gun, approximately four to five inches 
long, with a clip* She said she could not see his face but heard 
him say "you bastard" just before he shot Duncan. The voice 
sounaed familiar to her (R. 58^-87) . She also told Chier Bell 
she had met defendant in Miami once over a year earlier, 
detenaant knew Duncan did not like him, and Duncan's dislike for 
defendant was "immense" (R. 595-96). 
Tyrell was bothered by tne fact that she could not 
relate more details of the incident (Tyrell 102-03). On October 
19, 1984, only ten weeks after the murder, Tyrell, on her own 
initiative, went to Dr. Hillroyd, a clinical psychologist, at the 
University ot California at Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.). (Tyrell 68-
69, 100, 102-03; R. 282). She underwent hypnosis in hopes of 
regaining her memory ot the details ot that night (R. 510; Tyrell 
100). Dr. Hillroyd's hypnotism of Tyrell was independent of the 
police investigation and prosecution and was not influenced 
thereby. Tyrell and Dr. Hillroyd were alone during the session, 
and the session was not suggestive or leading (Tr. Vol. 1 at 89-
90). Additionally, Dr. Hillroyd conducted and taped the 
prehypnosis interview ot Tyrell, which was transcribed and 
presented as evidence at the pretrial suppression hearing and at 
triax. She also videotaped the hypnosis session itself, which 
Tyrell later reviewed and which was also presented as evidence at 
the pretrial suppression hearing (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Detenaanfs Motion to Suppress Tyrell1s Testimony—Exhibits A and 
B. Ptl. Tr. 58-60, 64, 65; Tr. Vol, 1 at 75; Tyrell 85-86, 100) 
(R. 272-87) •) Defense counsel was provided with tne prehypnosis 
and hypnosis statements, as was the district court (R. 10, 47, 
316; Tr* Vol. 1 at 75) . 
During tne ptfihypnosis interview, Tyrell described tne 
man she saw. she said she saw hair on his legs, like he was 
wearing shorts. He seemed to be dressed in black. He had 
goldish-medium blond hair, unkept, thick and curly. She told Dr. 
Hillroyd the gunman said "you bastard" and Duncan said "No," and 
then she heard the gun go off (R. 2 81).^ 
At trial, Tyrell's general description ot tne gunman 
was consistent with her earlier descriptions (Tyrell 21-24). She 
further testified that the defendant was the gunman who burst 
into the Brian Oliver home and shot Duncan in the head (Tyrell 
24-25, 36). She said she recognized tne assailant's voice as tne 
defendant's (Tyrell 23, 84) and could identify the defendant as 
the gunman because he had distinctive legs and a unique walk 
(wnat she identified as knock-knees or "duck-legs"), as did the 
assailant (Tyrell 62-67 5)• She further noted tne gunman wore a 
nylon stocking over his head and face (Tyrell 23-24). 
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 Although the videotape ot tne hypnosis session was presented to 
the trial court, it is not part ot the record on appeal. 
Thererore, the detenaant has failed to supply a sufficient record 
to determine the inadmissibility of Tyrell1s posthypnosis 
testimony on the basis ot its reliability. For this reason 
alone, defendant's appeal could be dismissed. State v. Qlmos 712 
P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah I98t>) . 
£t. Hanley v. State. 624 P.2d 1387, 1391-92 (Nev. 1981), and 
People v. Home* 619 P.2d 53 (Colo. Iy80) (where presentence 
report's omission from record on appeal required dismissal of 
sentencing challenge). 
In addition, Tyrell stated that she did not tell Chief 
Bell on August 4 and 6, 1984, tnat she knew the gunman was the 
detenaant because her brotner, who was present at the August 6 
interview, had advised her to say as little as possible until she 
could obtain counsel, and because defendant was still at large 
and she was afraid for her own safety should she identify him 
(Ptl. Tr. 80, Tyrell 25, 42, 77, 92). She testified tnat tne 
description of the defendant given at the early interviews was, 
however, accurate (Tyrell 93). 
Prior to trial, the detenaant filed motions to suppress 
both Tyrell1s hypnotically refreshed testimony and testimony 
obtained trom Jeanette Guffey's interception ot detenaantfs 
telephone call to Sean Sears on the night of the murder (R. 415, 
4b3) • These motions were heard on January 16, 1986, just before 
the jury was impaneled (Tr. Vol. 1 at 72-108, 123-35). 
On the motion regarding Tyrell1s testimony, tne 
defendant presented expert witness evidence tnat hypnosis does 
not meet the general acceptance Frye test (Tr. Vol. 1 at 7/-96) , 
and the state proffered independent corroborative testimony of 
Tyrell1s post-hypnosis statements, namely tne admissions ot 
defendant to Kari Garner, Ralph Garner, and Sean Sears tnat he 
haa shot Duncan (Tr. Vol. 1 at 97-10/). The trial court ruled 
that there was sufficient independent corroboration (Tr. Vol. 1 
at 98) and suosequently denied tne motion (R. 60/-691)• 
On the motion regarding the intercepted telephone 
conversation, the trial judge tound that the conversation was not 
wiltully intercepted and was, therefore, lawful (R. 606). This 
motion was also denied (R. 606, 689; Tr. Vol. 1 at 13b). 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMEMT 
This Court should adopt the majority rule that 
hypnotically refreshed memory testimony is admissible and tnat 
the prior hypnosis ot the witness atfects the credibility/ not 
admissibilityf ot her testimony. Moreover, even if the testimony 
ot Patricia Tyrell were improperly admitted in the instant case, 
any error to the defendant was harmless. 
The AT&T operator's inadvertent interception ot the 
defendant's collect telephone call from Park West to Sean Sears 
in Miami, Florida, heard while she was perrormmg duties 
necessary to her employment, is wholly within Utah Code Ann. S 
7/-23a-2(a)(i) (1^8^) and theretore lawful. Consequently, it was 
proper to admit that conversation and any evidence derived 
thererrom. 
APgPMEHT 
JEQIWT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ADMITTING PATRICIA TYRELL "S 
POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY. 
Detendant argues that his conviction should be reversed 
and, at the very least, remanded for a new trial, on the grounds 
that the trial court failed to limit the testimony ot Patricia 
Tyrell to prehypnosis testimony. This argument should be rejected 
for two reasons. First, under the majority and better reasoned 
rule, hypnotically refreshed memory testimony is admissible, and 
the fact that a witness has been hypnotized goes to weight, not 
admissibility. Second, even if this Court were to hold 
hypnotically retreshed memory testimony inadmissible, that portion 
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ot Patricia Tyrell's testimony that might have resulted from 
hypnotic refreshing was not critical to the outcome of the present 
case. Theretore, its admission constituted, at most, harmless 
error. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE MAJORITY HOLE 
THAT HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY IS 
ADMISSIBLE AMD THAT THE WITNESS1 PREVIOUS 
HYPNOSIS AFFECTS CREDIBILITY, NOT 
ADMISSIBILITY. 
The issue ot admissibility ot testimony trom a 
previously hypnotized witness is a question ot first impression in 
the State ot Utah which lends itself to no easy solution.4 
Courts have almost uniformly held tnat evidence derived from a 
witness while he is in a hypnotic trance is unreliable and must be 
excluded. However, a more complex problem arises when, as in the 
case at bar, a witness uses hypnosis to retresh her recollection 
ot the event is subsequently asked to testify about tnat event at 
triai. Under this factual setting, jurisdictions have taken 
essentially tnree different approaches regarding the use of 
testimony trom witnesses whose memories have been enhanced by 
hypnosis. In State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983), the 
Court defined tfce tnree different approaches as follows: 
The majority of jurisdictions appear to 
have declared that hypnotically induced 
testimonial recall generally poses no barrier 
to admissibility, but, ratner, attects only 
the weight of the testimony. The federal 
courts have adopted tnis rule. See United 
States Yt AwKard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), 
££££• denied. 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 1/9, 
62 L.Ed.2d 116 (1979); United States Yt 
* This issue was presented in State v. Tuttle, Supreme Court Case 
No. 20068, but this Court has not yet ruled in tnat case. 
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hOms., 581 F.2d 1983 (9th Cir.), £e_r_fc. 
iianieji, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S. Ct. 621, 58 L. 
Ed. 2d 683 (1978); United States v. Waksal. 
539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United 
States Vi Narcisor 44t F. supp. 252 (E.D. 
Mich. 1977). See generally Annot.. 50 A.L.R. 
Fed. 602 (198u). The same approach has been 
taken in Georgia [Creamer v. State. 232 Ga. 
136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); Illinois fPeople 
v. Smrekar. 68 111. App. 3d 379, 24 111. Dec. 
70/, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979)]; Indiana [Pearson 
Y« State, Ind., 441 N.E.2d 468 (1982); Moxaail 
v. State, Ind. App., 445 N.E.2d 585 (1983)]; 
Louisiana [State v. Wren. 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 
1983)1; Missouri [State v. Greer. 609 S.W.2d 
423 (Mo.Ct.App.1980), vacated on oth*r 
grounds. 450 U.S. 102/, 101 S. Ct. 173a, 68 
L. Ed. 2d 222 (1981)]; North Carolina [State 
v. McQueen. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 4l4 
(1978)]; Oregon [State y, Brom,, 8 Or. App. 
598, 494 P.2d 434 (1972); State v. Joraensen. 
8 Or.App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1978)J; Tennessee 
[State v. Glebock. 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Cr. 
App.1981)J; and Wyoming [Chapman v. State. 
63b P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 198/)]. See generally 
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979). 
Other courts have allowed the admission 
of hypnotically induced testimony subject to 
compliance with certain procedural sateguards 
designed to ensure reliability. These 
jurisdictions include Florida [Brown v. 
S_£a_t£, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983)]; New Jersey [State v. Hurd. 86 N.J. 
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981)]; New Mexico fState 
v. Beachum. 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 24b (Ct. 
App. 1981)J; and Washington] State v. Martinf 
33 Wash. App. 486, 656 P.2d 526 (198/); State 
v. Long. 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 
(1982)]. 
Recently, a number or jurisdictions have held 
that a witness who has undergone pre-trial 
hypnosis is incompetent to testify as to the 
subject matter discussed at the hypnotic 
session, and, thus, that persons's testimony 
is per se inadmissible. These jurisdictions 
include Arizona [State v. Mena. 128 Ariz. 
226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981) J; California 
[People v. Shiney. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. 
Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775, ££JL£. denied. 
U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 13, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1400 
(1982)]; Maryland [Collins v. State. 52 Md. 
App. 186, 44/ A.2d 1//2 (1982); Polk v. 
16-
fijtaifir 48 Md. App. 382, 417 A.2d 1041 
(1981)J; Michigan [People Yt Gonzales, 415 
Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (198^)]; Minnesota 
[State v, Mackl, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 
198U)]; Nebraska [State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 
206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981; and Pennsylvania 
[Com, v. Nazarovitch. 49b Pa. 978, 436 A.2d 
170 (1981)]. 
337 N.W.2d at 149 (tootnote omitted). 
It is impossible to reconcile the approaches set forth 
by tne above courts or to arrive at a rule which will entirely 
satisfy all the demands of logic, policy, and practicality. 
However, as indicated in the following argument, this Court should 
adopt the position of the majority of states and the federal 
courts which permits the testimony to be admitted and allows tne 
jury to determine its weight. 
Utah R. Evid. 601 provides: 
Every person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided in 
these rules. 
In BxflHUr 337 N.W.2d at 138, the North Dakota Supreme Court relied 
on an identical rule of evidence in holding tnat hypnosis affects 
the weight, but not the admissibility ot testimony. Brown 
attacked and sexually assaulted a 19-year old woman and left her 
in a confused and upset state. She described her assailant as 
heavy-set and wearing blue jeans and leather boots, with long dark 
hair and possibly a beard. The victim saw the defendant on tne 
street when returning to the crime scene and indicated tnat he 
could have been the individual who attacked her, but she was not 
sure. However, after being placed under hypnosis, the victim was 
shown a photographic lineup containing a picture ot the detenaant 
from which she made a positive identitication of defendant as her 
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assailant. She also positively identified tne detenaant as her 
assailant at the preliminary hearing and at trial over the 
objection ot detense counsel* Atter considering tne various 
positions taken by other jurisdictions, the North Dakota court 
held tnat most post-hypnotic testimony is admissible unaer tne 
following rationale: 
Having carefully considered tne pros and 
cons of the various positions adopted by the 
courts in deciding tnis issue, and having 
weighed the benefits of hypnotically inauced 
recall testimony against tne inherent risks, 
we are not convinced that a witness should be 
renaerea incompetent to testify merely 
because he or she was hypnotized during the 
investigatory phase ot a criminal case. Rule 
6 01 ot the North Dakota Rules of Evidence 
provides that: "Every person is competent to 
be a witness except as otherwise provided in 
these rules." Our rules ot evidence do not 
provide that a previously hypnotized witness 
is incompetent to testify. We believe tnat 
an attack on credibility is the proper method 
ot determining the value ot hypnotically 
induced testimony. See Rule 607, N.D.R. Ev.; 
Chapman$ supra, 63b p.2d at lzb4. 
Accordingly, we align ourselves with the 
majority ot jurisdictions which have held 
that hypnosis affects credibility but not 
admissibility. 
337 N.W.2d at 151. 
In People v. Smrekar, 6B 111. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 
848 (1979), the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court 
also considered whetner identification by a witness was admissible 
after the witness had been subjected to hypnosis. The witness was 
, able to identify the detenaant in a homicide case atter a hypnosis 
session, although she admitted prior to being hypnotized tnat ner 
chances ot being able to identity tne person she saw were only 
"50-50." The Court allowed the testimony of the previously 
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hypnotized witness. In response to detenaant*s argument that the 
prior hypnosis suggested defendant's identitication to the witness 
and deprived the detenaant ot cross-examination, the court 
responded: 
Detenaant bases his claim ot error 
partly upon a deprivation of his right to 
cross-examine the previously hypnotized 
witness. However, the ability to cross-
examine the witnesses is one element tnat 
distinguishes the use of testimony of the 
previously hypnotized witness from tne 
impermissible procedure of introducing 
testimony ot tne hypnotist as to the 
statements made to him by the patient 
while unaer hypnosis. While tne hypnosis 
could atfect the mind of the witness in 
such a suoconscious way tnat the cross-
examination could not reach, all witnesses 
are, to some extent, suo^ect to suoconscious 
stimuli similarly obscure. 
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305 N.E.2d at 855»5 
* Compare People Vt zayasr m . App. 3d , N.E.2d , 
slip op. no* 84-1400 (June 26, 1987) (In triple murder case, 
officer's hypnotically enhanced testimony regarding tne license 
number ot the assailant's get-away car was ruled inadmissible as 
not reliable, but pre-hypnotic recollections were held 
admissible), provided in Addendum A. Zayas can be distinguished 
on severax grounas. First, in Zayas, the First District, Fitth 
Division, Illinois Appellate Court, noted tnat the Fourth 
District ot tnat court reartirmed its holding in Smrekar in 
People v. Gibson, 117 111. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983). 
It furtner notea tnat tne Smrekar approach was also adopted by 
the First District, Third Division, of the Illinois Appellate 
Court in People v. Jordan, 120 111. App. 3d 836, 458 N.E.2d 1115 
(1983), the Third District, in People v. Byas, 117 111. App. 3d 
979, 453 N.E.2d 1141 (1983), and the Fitth District in People v. 
Cahoon. 120 111. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998 (1983). qahoon was 
suosequently overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court, but tnis 
reversal was based on that Courts general determination that, in 
any event, the identitication at issue was impermissibly 
suggestive. People v. Cahoon, 104 111. 2d 295, 472 N.E.2d 403 
(1984) . Based on Cahoon, the Fifth Appellate District has since 
ruled that a trial court properly excluded a clinical 
psychologist's testimony tnat, wniie unaer hypnosis, the 
defendant non-verbally denied committing the offenses in 
question. People v. Duckett, 133 111. App. 3d 639, 479 N.E.2d 
355 (1985). While that Court generally noted possible 
deticiencies in hypnosis testimony, that case can be 
distinguished from cases where hypnoticaxly enhanced testimony is 
admitted in tnat the expert was testifying as to tne detenaant's 
hearsay statements made while under typnosis. The Zayas court 
tnererore improperly extenas tne holding in the distinguishable 
case ot Duckett, 133 111. App. 3d 639, 479 N.E.2d 3b5 (1*85), to 
rule tnat all hypnosis testimony is inadmissible. Zayas, slip 
op. No. 84-1400 at 6 (Addendum A). 
Secona, the Zayas court neglects to list most federal court cases 
which hold hypnotically refreshed testimony admissible and fails 
to list several state jurisdictions which also hold. Compare 
State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983), cited in this brief 
at lb-lb, SiiSLAi and People v. Zayas. slip op. at 6 (Addendum A) . 
And third, these federal court decisions are more persuasive 
because they rely on tne Federal Rules ot Evidence, which tne 
Utah legislature adopted verbatim with few specitic exceptions. 
See discussion at 25; Utah Court Rules Ann. at 63*; Advisory 
Committee notes to Utah R. Evid. Rules 102, 601 and 607 (1987). 
Illinois1 evidence rules are not patterned atter the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 110A ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1982). 
And fourtn, the reasoning in &a&as is not applicable to Utah 
cases because it erroneously applied the Frye standard for expert 
scientific opinion testimony to a lay witness* factual testimony. 
Further, under Fed. R. Evid. Rules 702, 703 and 704 (and Utah R. 
Evid. Rules 702, 703 and 704) , the frye general acceptance test 
no longer applies. Point I.B. 
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Similarly, in State v. Joroensen. 492 P.2d 312 (1971) , 
the court stated: 
Since both ot these witnesses gave their 
testimony concerning the issues of the case 
in open court and were subjected to prolonged 
and rigorous cross-examination by defendant's 
counsel betore the jury, we do not believe 
that the fact they had been subjected to 
certain psychiatric and medical examinations 
and procedures prior to testifying, which 
were fully exposed in the evidence, would be 
a basis for disallowing their testimony. 
Nor would tne fact that Mrs. Essex had told 
different stories at previous times be a basis 
for disallowing tneir testimony. Detenaant's 
strenuous objections to their testimony both 
at trial and on appeal go to its weight ratner 
than its admissibility. 
492 P.2d at 315 (citations omitted). 
In Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982), the 
victim/witness found an intruder in his home upon returning from 
work. A struggle ensued wherein the intruder struck the witness 
on tne hand and above the right eye with a hammer and tnen fled. 
The witness gave a general description of the intruder after the 
incident. Added details to the previous description were given 
after the witness was twice hypnotized by city police otficers. 
The detense attorney objected to the witness's identification 
testimony, since it was enhanced by the use of hypnosis. In 
holding tne testimony admissible, the court stated: 
The jury had before it the circumstances 
ot the identitication, including tne part 
played therein by the hypnotic sessions. 
Appellant*s attack on tne credibility ot 
the witness was before the jury. The 
success ot such attack was for determination 
by the jury. 
The majority ot tne States are in accord. 
Such testimony is allowed, leaving it to the 
fact finder to gauge tne credibility ot it 
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on the basis ot that presented to tne fact 
tinder concerning the affect [sic] of 
hypnotism generally and in tne specific case. 
(Citations omitted.) 638 P.2d at 1282. 
In so holding, the Court relied on Rules 601 and 607 ot 
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, which are identical to Rules 601 
and 607 ot the Utah Rules ot Evidence. These rules provide: 
RULE 601. Every person is competent to 
be a witness except as otnerwise provided in 
these rules. 
Rule 607. The credibility ot a witness 
may be attacked by any party, including the 
party calling him. 
In the recent case ot Gee v. State* 662 P.2d lu3 (Wyo. 
1983)f the Wyoming Supreme Court reartirmed its decision in 
Chapman* but added that the State must alert the defenaant to tne 
fact of its witness1 prior hypnosis and any statement or 
proceedings concerning the hypnosis session must be made available 
to the defense. These safeguards have been met in the case at bar 
Point I.C. at 33-34, infra. 
In Pearson v. State. 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982) , tne 
court allowed the witness1 identification testimony despite a 
ratner tainted hypnotic session. The hypnotist was a state police 
officer with some informal hypnosis training, ratner than an 
impartial psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in tne use ot 
hypnosis. The investigating police orticer was present during the 
tape recorded hypnosis session* but the tapes turned out to be 
inaudible. There was evidence of improper suggestion during the 
hypnotic session* including the showing ot defendant's picture. 
Despite these problems, the Court allowed the testimony with the 
following explanation: 
• . • [TJhe only facts which the victim 
changed after the hypnosis session were the 
color ot the detenaanfs shirt, the possi-
bility that he was wearing a hatf and how 
much ot his face she actually saw during the 
crime. Her identitication of defendant and 
her description ot the major incidents ot tne 
crime were not changed. The jury was aware 
ot the circumstances ot the identitication, 
the procedures used during the hypnosis 
session, and the changes in tne victim's 
testimony after the hypnosis. The victim 
was a competent witness with respect to tne 
identitication of defendant and the neces-
sary elements ot the corpus delecti about 
which she had testified prior to the 
hypnosis session. The determination ot the 
weight of her testimony was for the jury. 
We tind there was no error in the admission 
of the victim's testimony and in the trial 
court's overruling ot defendant's motion to 
suppress and motion to dismiss based on this 
issue. 
441 N.E.2d at 4/3-74 (citation omitted). The facts testified to 
in the present case are nearly identical, gee this briet, Point 
I.D. at 35-37# infra, and the Statement ot Facts at 10-13, supra. 
The Pearson decision was relied upon in Morgan v. 
State, 445 N.E.2d 585 (1983). In Morgan, two witnesses to a 
murder and battery were hypnotized by a police otticerr and the 
detenaant filed a pretrial motion to suppress their testimony. 
This motion was deniedf and the witnesses were allowed to testify. 
The fact that the hypnotist was not an indepenaent psychiatrist or 
psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis and tnat the 
sessions were conaucted in the presence ot tnird persons were 
considered to be factors affecting the witnesses' credibilityf 
ratner than renaering their testimony incompetent. 
In State v. Glebock. 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Cr. App. 
198i)
 9 the court allowed tne testimony ot a victim ot a shooting 
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incident wno was placed unaer hypnosis in an attempt to obtain 
further information concerning the crime, and particularly a 
license number ot a vehicle in question. The court stated: 
This is a question of first impression in 
this state; but atter reading many 
authorities, we think that the sound and 
prevailing rule, though not universal, is 
tnat stated by the 9th Circuit, U.S. Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Adams. 581 F.2d 
193, 198-199 (note 12)(9th Cir. 1978): 
"Until today we have considerea only in 
civil actions the admissibility of testimony 
based on memories rerreshed unaer hypnosis. 
We have held tnat the fact of hypnosis 
attects credibility but not admissibility. 
Kline v. Ford Motor Company. Inc. 523 F.2d 
1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. 
Fairchiid Biller Corp># 503 F.2d 506, 509 
(9th Cir.1974). 
Other Courts considering this problem in 
the context of criminal trials have generaxly 
followed tne same approach. State v. 
Jpggensenr 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312, 315-16 
(1*71); Harding Vt gute, 5 Md. App. 230, 24t> 
A.2d 302, 311-12 (1968). Reversals have been 
predicated only on tne tanure to disclose 
the fact of hypnosis. United States v. 
MilifiJLf 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); Emmett 
v.» Ricketts. 397 F. Supp. lu^5 (habeas writ 
issued). We believe tnis reasoning is souna. 
616 S.W.2d at 903. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Wren, 425 So. 
2d 756 (La. 1983), and the Georgia Supreme Court, in qreamer v. 
State. 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 140 (1974), also held tnat tne 
refreshment or enhancement of a witness' memory through hypnosis 
. atfects credibility ratner than admissibility. 
As indicated in State v. Brown. 337 N.W.2d at 138, the 
Federal Courts have also adopted tne rule admitting tne testimony 
of a witness who has been placed under hypnosis. Inasmuch as the 
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Utah Rules ot Evidence were modeled atter the Federal Rules ot 
Evidence (Utah Court Rules Ann. at 639; Advisory Committee notes 
to Utah R. Evid. Rules 102, 601 and 607 (1987), this Court should 
follow the Federal position by ruling tnat the testimony of 
Patricia Tyrell was properly admitted at trial. 
This position is further supported by Utah R. Evid. 102 
which spates: 
These rules should be construed to secure 
fairness in administration, elimination of 
unjustitiable expense and delay and promotion 
of growth and development of the law of 
evidence to the end tnat the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
Disallowing tne testimony ot Patricia Tyrell would be inconsistent 
with this admonition tnat the courts admit such evidence as will 
assist in tne ascertainment ot truth. 
The defendant challenges these decisions which hold 
tnat hypnotically retreshed testimony goes to credibility, not 
admissibility, on the ground tnat they preceded scientific 
literature now denouncing this evidence as unreliable. See 
Defendant's Brief at 27-28. This argument is unpersuasive for 
several reasons. First, there is scientitic evidence contrary to 
defendant's position. £££. generally R* Udolf, Forensic Hypnosis 
11-16 (198J) and authorities cited therein. Second, even in tne 
face of his protfered literature, the defendant cites only one 
case listed in Rumi* State Y» McQtfeen# 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 
414 (1974), that has been overruled. State v. Peoples, ill N.C. 
515, 5J2, J19 S.E.2d 177, 187 (1984). Third, most ot these cases 
holding for admissibility were decided from 1978 through 1986, 
either in tne wake ot such literature or atter, when the material 
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was available for the courts1 consideration and deliberation. See 
Defendant's Briet, Table of Cases and Authorities# at v. And 
fourths despite such literature, the most recent cases still hold 
for admissibility. 
In its recent decision in Rock v. Arkansas* U.S. 
# 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
considerea the constitutionality ot Arkansas' per se rule 
excluding a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony. 
Rock was charged with manslaughter for shooting her husoana. To 
refresh her memory as to the precise details of the shooting, she 
twice underwent taped hypnosis by a trained neuropsychologist. 
Afterwards, she remembered details indicating tnat the gun was 
detective and had misfired. This evidence was corroborated by 
expert witness testimony. However, the trial judge ruled tnat no 
hypnotically rerreshed testimony would be admitted, thus limiting 
the defendant's testimony to her statements made prior to 
hypnosis. The Arkansas Supreme Court attirmed her convictionf 
ruling that the limitations on her testimony did not violate her 
constitutional right to testity in her own behalf, and tnat 
hypnotically refreshed testimony is so unreliable as to be 
inadmissible per se. The Court held tnat tnis per se rule 
impermissibly infringed on a criminal defendant's right to testify 
in her own behalf. 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15. 
While Rock's claim and this decision were "bottomed on 
her constitutional right to testity in her own defensel,!" the 
Court did note that 
[d]espite the unreliability tnat hypnosis 
concededly may introducer . . . the procedure 
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has been credited as instrumental in obtaining 
investigative leads or identitications tnat 
were later confirmed by independent evidence. 
&££r e.g. , People y, Hughes, 59 N.y.2d 523, 533, 
453 N.E.2d 484, 488 (198J); pee generally R. 
Udolf, Forensic Hypnosis 11-16 (1983). 
The inaccuracies tne process introduces can be re-
duced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the 
use ot procedural sareguards. • • • The more 
traditional means of assessing accuracy ot 
testimony also remain applicable in tne case ot 
a previously hypnotized defendant. Certain 
information recalled as a result ot hypnosis may 
be verified as highly accurate by corroborating 
evidence. Cross-examination, even in the face ot 
a contident defendant, is an effective tool for 
revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can 
be educated to the risks of hypnosis through 
expert testimony and cautionary instructions. 
Id. at 2713-14. While the Supreme Court noted tnat it was 
expressing no opinion on the admissibility ot testimony ot 
previously hypnotized witnesses other than the criminal defendant, 
Rock. 107 S. Ct. 2712 n. 15, all ot the above arguments delmeatea 
by the Court are equally applicable to a witness1 hypnotically 
rerresned testimony and support the majority position allowing 
this testimony to be admitted at trial. Rock also cites many of 
the same cases discussed here in support ot its analysis. Id., at 
2713 n. 16. 
Several post-1985 opinions, even in tne face ot 
defendant's literature, show continuing support for the 
admissibility hypnotically refreshed testimony. See, e.g.. 
McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(reliability evaluation); Beck v. Norns, 8Ul F.2d 242, 244-45 
(6th Cir. 1986) (hypnotically enhanced testimony admissible if 
procedural sateguards followed); and Wicker v. McCotter. 783 F.2d 
487, 492-93 (5th Cir. l*8t>) (probative value ot testimony weighed 
against its prejudicial etfect)# cert, flenied* U.S. 
(198b)• In both Garrison and McCotter . the circuit courts 
advocated conducting an individualized inquiry in each case. See 
fll££ United States v. Kimbenin, 805 F.2d 210, 21* (7th Cir. 
1986)? Barter V, Marylandr 800 F.2d 437, 441-43 (4th Cir. 1986); 
Clay Vt VQSSr 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 198b); Sprynczynatyk v. General 
Motors CorPtf 771 F.2d 1H2 (8th Cir. Iy85) , ££JL£. ££Ri£&, 
U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 12b3 (1986); State v. King. 84 Or. App. 16s, 
7J3 P.2d 472 (1987); Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986); 
State V. ClarKf 104 N.M. 434, 722 P.2d 685, 691 (1986); PQtS yf 
££&££# 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985). 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD HOT APPLY THE FRYE TEST 
TO DISALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA TYRELL. 
Those courts which have rerused to admit hypnotically 
refreshed testimony have generally relied upon the "general 
acceptance" or "Frye Rule" originally set forth in Frye v. Unitea 
States, 293 F. Iul3 (D.C. Cir. 1923). These courts reason that 
tne testimony ot a witness wno has undergone hypnosis to retresn 
memory recall is J2£JL ££. inadmissible in a criminal trial because 
hypnosis* as a means ot obtaining accurate recall, has not gained 
general scientitic acceptance. 
Many courts have criticized tne application ot tne 
"Frye Rule" to hypnotically induced testimony. In Brown v. StateP 
42b So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. ly8i), tne court stated: 
. . . [W]e conclude that the method by 
which testimony is hypnotically induced is 
not one tnat falls within the ambit of Frye-
"[Technically the test is not directly 
applicable because it is concerned with the 
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admissibility ot expert opinion deduced trom 
the results of a scientific technique, such 
as a lie detector test, and not with tne 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony." (426 
So. 2d 89). Note, The Admissibility ot 
Testimony Intluenced by Hypnosis, 67 Va. L. 
Rev. 1203, 1217 (198i) (e.s.); accord, 
Commonwealth Vt Juvenilef 381 Mass. 727, 423 
N.E.2d 339, 342-343 (1980). Our view is 
supported by tnat ot tne New Jersey Supreme 
Court in State v. Hurd, which observed: 
Unlike the courts in Mena* supra, 
and Mack, Sdl£L£? the court below 
did not demand, as a precondition 
of admissibility, tnat hypnosis be 
generally accepted as a means ot 
reviving truthtul or historically 
accurate recall. We tnink tnis was 
correct. The purpose of using 
hypnosis is not to obtain trutn, as 
a polygraph or "truth serum" is 
supposed to do. Instead, hypnosis 
is employed as a means ot 
overcoming amnesia and restoring 
the memory of a witness. See 
Spector & Foster, Admissibility pfc 
Hypnctic Statements; Is the Law of 
gvidence Susceptible?* 38 Ohio st. 
L.J. 567, 584 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . . . . In 
light ot tins purpose, hypnosis can 
be considered reasonably reliable 
if it is able to yield recollec-
tions as accurate as those of an 
ordinary witness, whicn likewise 
are often historically inaccurate. 
4i2 A.2d at 92. JSfi£ also Stfrte Vt 
Bfiadmmr 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246, 
252 (Ct. App. 1981). (426 So. 2d 
at 89, 90) . 
Id. at 89-90. 
In Wisconsin v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 5bb, 329 N.W.2d 
386 (1983), the court commented on the application of the frye 
rule to the admissibility ot testimony attectea by hypnosis, 
stating: 
Even if this court applied tne test set 
out in Frye, tnat test could not be used to 
determine tne admissibility ot hypnotically 
attected testimony. Frye applied to the 
admissibility ot "expert testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle." 
(293 F. at 1014). Here, it is not expert 
testimony that is challenged. Rather, it is 
the admissibility of an eyewitness1 post-
hypnosis identification which is in question. 
. . . But it is not the reliability of 
hypnosis to put one in a hypnotic trance that 
is at issue when the witness testifies. It 
is the reliability ot a specific human memory 
as affected by hypnosis that must be 
examined. There are no experts who can 
testify as to wnat specific etfects hypnosis 
has had on the witness1 memory; just as there 
are no experts who can testify tnat a normal 
waking memory ot an event is in fact a 
completely accurate representation of wnat 
actually occurred. The most a trial judge 
can do is review the hypnotic session to 
ensure that no impermissible suggestiveness 
has occurred. However, in such a review, it 
is not the reliability ot hypnosis that is to 
be examined. Rather, it is the etfect of a 
specific hypnotic session that is to be 
determined. 
We conclude that the test set out in 
Frye is inapplicable to this case. (329 N.W. 
2d at 3SJ3> . 
The strict per se inadmissibility rule which is 
premised on Frye is unduly harsh and restricts valuable evidence 
designed to disclose the truth. Not only is a witness precluded 
from testifying regarding the occurrence of a crime, but such a 
position also discourages proper investigation ot the crime and 
apprehension of the criminal. As stated in State v. Beachum. 97 
N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 24b (198^), such a position places the State in 
the dilemma of choosing to use a particular witness at trial or to 
use hypnosis on the witness as an investigatory tool. The case at 
bar presents a good example of this dilemma. 
Under Frye* the party offering expert testimony has tne 
burden of showing that that expert's opinion is reliable. In the 
case or hypnotically rerreshed testimony, there is no such burden 
because the testimony offered is tnat of a lay witness testifying 
as to facts as she recalls them. Because hypnotically rerreshed 
testimony does not fall within the ambit of the Frye Rule and, 
moreover, because the application ot the Rule would hamper 
legitimate law enforcement etforts and inhibit the ascertainment 
ot truth, the Frye test should not be applied to determine tne 
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony nor the burden 
ot proot. 
Detenoant argues the Tyrell's testimony must be 
excluded under Frye, as not a generally accepted scientitic 
technique and also that the State failed to sustain its burden 
under Fryq by not presenting expert testimony as to the 
reliability ot post-hypnosis testimony. Relying on Phillips v. 
Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), decided prior to the adoption 
or the new rules ot evidence, he claims the evidence must be 
excluded for lack of foundation because it is not "sutticiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the field" and is 
not "sutticiently reliable." !£. at 1233. (Phillips is based, in 
part, on the well-known Frye standard, 29J F. at 1U14.) This 
argument is inconsistent with the clear language of new Utah R. 
Evid. Rule 702 (1987) , which says notning about general 
acceptance. Moreover, Rule 401 broadly defines relevant 
evidence,0 and Rule 402 states that all relevant evidence is 
admissible except as otherwise provided under the Constitution, a 
federal statute, or anotner rule. 
Scientitic evidence can be relevant and tnus admissible 
under Rule 401 and 702, even if not generally accepted. See, J. 
Wemstem and M. Berger, 3 Wemstem's Evidence S 702103J (1985). 
This explains why courts are now abandoning the Frye standard, 
and recognizing that novel techniques or applications are a 
factor for the trier of fact to consider and weigh, not a 
tnresnold requirement for admissibility. State v. William* 4 
Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983); State v. Williams. 388 
A.2d 5U0 (Me. 1978); United States v. Williams. 58J F.2d 1194 (2d 
Cir. 1978); Gannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific 
Evidence; Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later. 80 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1197, 1208-23 (1980). This is not to say tnat a trial 
judge, taced with a chariatan could not exclude grossly 
unreliable testimony on the ground it is neither relevant under 
Rule 401, nor helpful to the trier ot fact unaer Rule 702. 
Judge Daniels made an assessment in this case to admit 
Tyreil's testimony as sufficiently and independently corroborated 
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 97). This was not an abuse of discretion, 
especially given that tne defense, at trial and betore tne jury, 
failed to submit the videotaped session and called no experts of 
its own to dispute the reliability ot hypnosis testimony. Nor 
6
 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that "having any tenaency 
to make the existence of any fact tnat is of consequence to the 
determination ot the action more probable or less probable tnan 
it would be without the evidence." 
would a detenaant be precluded from objecting to the evidence 
under Rule 403 on the ground tnat the probative value of the 
evidence is suostantiaxly outweighed by tne danger ot unfair 
prejudice, contusion, or misleading the trier of fact, or by 
considerations on undue delay or waste ot time, gee State v. 
U££L£, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984). While defendant 
objected to Tyrell's testimony as too suggested, he did not make 
a Rule 403 objection either at the pretrial suppression hearing 
or at trial. 
C. THIS COURT COULD ALSO FIND THAT THE 
TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA TYRELL WAS ADMISSIBLE 
BY ADOPTING A MINORITY VIEW THAT HYPNOTICALLY 
REFRESHED TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE ONLY IF 
ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN 
COMPLIED WITH. 
As noted above, the courts have taken three different 
positions regarding the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed 
testimony. First, there is the majority view—wnicn tne State 
urges this Court to adopt—that such testimony is admissible and 
that the defendant may adequately protect himself by attacking tne 
credibility of that testimony. Second, there is the minority 
view—wnicn tne State opposes and defendant advocates—that 
hypnotically refreshed testimony is per SJSL inadmissible. And 
tnird, there is anotner minority view wnich holds tnat 
hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible, but only if 
specific procedural safeguards have been met. Should tftis Court 
choose to adopt this third "procedural safeguards" view, the 
testimony ot Patricia Tyrell is still admissible. 
While the procedural safeguards required vary among 
jurisdictions following tnis approach, these courts have held 
that: a detenaant must be advised tnat a prosecution witness has 
been hypnotized and must be given all statements of the 
proceedings relative thereto, Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103, 104 
(Wyo. 1983), there must be a valid investigatory purpose. State v. 
Ii2aa# 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 84b, 84/ (1*8^); a trained 
psychiatrist or psychologist must conduct the hypnosis, and the 
individual conauctmg the hypnosis should be indepenaent ot, and 
not regularly employed by, the parties involved, State v. Wood, 86 
N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981). 
In tne present case, Tyrell sought out the hypnosis on 
her own. It was not compelled by police or the prosecutor. The 
hypnosis session was conducted by Dr. Hillroyd, a clinical 
psychologist at U.C.L.A., (Tyrell 68-69; R. 282) on October 19, 
1984 (Tyrell 100). Dr. Hillroyd's hypnotism ot Tyrell was 
independent of State influence (Tyrell 68-69). Both the 
prehypnosis statements given to Chiet Bell and Dr. Hillroyd were 
recorded and transcribed (R. 272-87; Memorandum in Opposition to 
Detenaant*s Motion to Suppress Tyrell's Testimony—Exhibits A and 
B; Pti. Tr. 58-60, 64, 65; Tr. Vol. 1 at 75; Tyrell 85-86), as was 
the hypnosis session itself (Tyrell 100; Exhibits A and B, supra). 
Moreover, defense counsel was provided the prehypnosis and 
hypnosis statements ot Patty Tyrell, as was the district court (R. 
10, 47, 316; Tr. Vol. 1 at 75). Only Tyrell and Dr. Hillroyd were 
present during the session, and the session was not suggestive or 
leading (Tr. Vol. 1 at 89-90).' Accordingly, the admission ot 
Patty Tyrell's hypnotically refreshed testimony was proper under 
tne "procedural sateguards" view* 
D. EVEN IF PATRICIA TYRELI^S HYPNOTICALLY 
REFRESHED TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE, ANY 
ERROR TO DEFENDANT WAS HARMLESS. 
This Court has repeatedly held that criminal 
convictions will be reversed only where error in the court below 
was prejudicial to tne defendant. See State v. Tucker» 709 P.2d 
313 (Utah ly85) ("Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that '[a]ny error which does not attect tne suostantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded.• We will not reverse a 
conviction unless the error •is sometning suostantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood 
tnat in its absence tnere would have been a different result.1" 
(citations omitted)). Thus, any error which would not likely have 
atfected tne outcome ot tne defendant*s case will be disregarded 
as harmless. 
In tne present case, even if hypnotically retreshed 
testimony were improperly admitted at trial, it is highly 
improbable tnat Tyrell's hypnosis and tne testimony resulting 
therefrom had any signiticant intluence upon the jury's verdict. 
1
 Defendant failed to make the videotape ot tne hypnosis session 
a part of the record on appeal. £££. note 2, sueta. In such 
cases, regularity ot the proceedings is presumed. State v. 
Qlm<2&, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 
(Utah l*8b). £f. Hanley v. State. 624 P.2d li«7, 13*1-92 (Nev. 
1981); and People v. Home. 619 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1980) (where 
sentence was challenged, failure to include presentence report in 
record on appeal required dismissal). 
Defendant and the State agree that information 
established as having been recalled prior to hypnosis has been 
held to be properly admissible at trial. See Defendant's Brief at 
15, 20. In the last minutes of August 4, 1^84, the night Fred 
Duncan was murdered, and the eariy hours ot August 5, 1984, Patty 
Tyrell gave a brief description of the assailant to police 
officers investigating the crime (R. 12/7-78). She told Officer 
Kip Ingersoll that the assailant was a tall male, wearing dark 
clothes, possibly shorts, and carrying a small black hanagun (Ptl. 
Tr. 36, 43). Later, at the Clinic in Park City, she told Chief 
Bell she saw a male, approximately six feet tall, medium build, 
wearing dark clothes, carrying a smooth flat pistol like an 
automatic (Ptl. Tr. 5 9) . 
Chief Bell interviewed Tyrell in his office on August 
6, 1984, just two days after the shooting (R. 542-99). When asked 
to describe tne gunman, Tyrell said he was dressed all in black 
and tnat he wore long pants. She said she could not see his face 
at all, but heard him say "You bastard" when he burst into tne 
living room of the Oliver home. The voice of the assailant 
sounaeo familiar to her. He carried a black gun, approximately 
four to five inches long, with a clip. (R. 582-87.) She told 
Chief Bell tnat she had met the defendant once over a year 
previous in Miami (R. 589, 592), but that defendant knew Duncan 
did not like him. She further stated that Duncan's dislike was 
immense (R. 595-96). 
On October 19, 1984, ot her own volition, Tyrell 
underwent hypnosis to try to regain her memory of the details of 
that night (R. 510; Tyrell 100)• During the prehypnosis interview 
with Dr. Hillroydf she related that she knew the defendant was 
dealing drugs and that she thought Duncan had interrupted 
something "going down between Preston and Brian [Oliver] and 
Preston was mad about it" (R. 28u). She indicated she saw hair on 
the gunman's legs like he was wearing shorts and tnat it seemed he 
was dressed in black. He had goldish—medium blonae hairf and it 
was unkeptf thick and curly. She remembers the gunman saying "You 
bastardf" Duncan saying "No#" and the gun going otf (R. 281). See 
SLL&Q. the Statement of Facts to this brief. 
Detenaant uses the majority ot his brier pointing out 
inconsistencies in these prehypnosis statements (Defendant's Brief 
at 3-7) • The majority ot these statements are consistent 
throughout/ giving a general description of the events and the 
assailant. Moreover, these prehypnosis statements do not suffer 
from any taint the defendant alleges hypnosis causes. Therefore, 
tney are all admissible and any inconsistencies in tnese 
statements go to Tyrell's credibility/ a question for the ;jury. 
At triali Tyrell only added that the assailant was 
wearing a nylon stocKing over his face (Tyrell 23-24)• However* 
otner evidence properly admitted at trial independently supports 
defendant's conviction and corroborates Tyrell's post-hypnotic 
testimony tnat the detenoant was the assailant who intentionally 
shot Duncan. Defendant admitted to Kari Garnerf Ralph Garner and 
Sean Sears that he shot Duncan. He turtner admitted at trial tnat 
he shot Duncan. Several witnesses testified tnat the defendant 
had long-running animosity toward Duncan, and that Duncan may have 
interterrea with defendant's drug dealings (Tr. Vol. 1 at 93, 97; 
Tyrell 35-36; 85; Tr. Vol. 2 at 266, 406-07, 415).8 Accordingly, 
any error in admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony was 
harmless.9 £££ Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (although 
hypnotically rerreshea testimony is inadmissible per se unaer 
Florida rule, the admission of this testimony constituted harmless 
error) and People v. Zayas, 111. App. 3d , N.E.2d , 
slip op. no. 84-1400 (June 26, 1987) (Addendum A) . 
PQIBfT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY DERIVED FROM 
THE INTERCEPTION OF A TELEPHONE CALL FROM 
THE DEFENDANT AND SEAN SEARS IN MIAMI, 
FLORIDA, ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDER. 
Detenaant argues also tnat his conviction should be 
reversed on the ground that the trial court admitted evidence 
obtained in violation ot Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-l et seq. (1982), 
the Interception of Communications Act. He cites Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23a-2(4) in support ot his claim. However, § 77-23a-2 is 
titled Legislative Findings. Its purpose is to outline the 
rationale ot tne Act, not described unlawful activity. Unlawful 
activity is described in S 77-23a-4(l). 
® For a complete discussion ot tne otner witnesses* testimony at 
trial and how they corroborate Tyrell1 s in-court testimony/ JSJ££. 
the Statement ot Facts to this Brief, supra at 2 and Point I.A. 
JELUE2L& at £5. 
' Defendant does not argue that the evidence against him was 
insurticient. Nor has he shown tnat the evidence would have been 
insufficient had Patty Tyrell"s testimony been excluded entirely. 
Section 77-23a-4(2) describes lawful intercepts and 
provides: 
(a)(i) It shall be lawful unaer this 
chapter for an operator of a switchboard, 
or an otficer, employee, or agent ot any 
communication common carrier, whose facilities 
are used in the transmission ot a wire 
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use 
that communication in the normal course ot his 
employment while engaged in any activity which 
is a necessary incident to the renaition ot his 
service or to the protection of the rights or 
property ot the carrier ot the communication, 
and the communication common carriers shall not 
utilize service observing or random monitoring 
except for mechanical or service quality 
control checks. 
At 2:00 a.nw on August 5, 1984, AT&T operator Jeanette 
Gutfey handled a collect telephone call trom the Park City area to 
Miami, Florida (Tr. Vol. 1 at 87-88, 91; Vol. 2 at 2!>4) . The 
person initiating the call in Park City indicated tnat the call 
was collect from Preston (Tr. Vol. 1 at 92), it was an emergency, 
and requested her to hurry the call through (Tr. Vol. 1 at 89). 
The call was placed to Sean Sears, a friend ot tne detenaant in 
Miami (Tr. Vol. 1 at 91 Vol. 2 at 250). Sears accepted the cail 
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 92; Vol. 2 at 250) , and Ms. Guffey pushed tne 
appropriate release button to disconnect herself from the call 
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 9J), but betore tne disconnect was complete, 
Preston said there had been an accident, a man tried to rip him 
otf, and he had killed him (Tr. Vol. 1 at 93) . The line then 
disconnected, and Ms. Gutfey heard no further conversation between 
Preston and Sears (Tr. Vol. 1 at 93). Shortly thereafter, Ms. 
Gutfey intormed a police acquaintance of wnat she had heard. She 
eventually discussed tne contents ot that conversation with Chiet 
Bell of the Park City Police Department (Tr. Vol. 1 at 94-95). 
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Ms. Guffey1s acts, theretore, tall squarely within Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23a-2(a)(i) and are lawtul in all respects. Ms. 
Guffey was acting in the normal course ot her employment when she 
connected the collect call to Sean Sears for the defendant. 
Furtner, she heard his confession that he had killed a man while 
in the process ot connecting tnat call and dropping it to a 
private line, an activity incident to rendition ot her services as 
an operator. The defendant simply started talking too soon. He 
began his conversation atter Ms. Guffey haa pusnea tne button to 
drop the call otf her line, but before his call had actually 
transferred. 
Where the intercept is inadvertent and lawful, ratner 
than wiiltul or deliberate, there is no rationale for suppression 
or wnat was overheard. Sections 77-23a-2(a)(i) and 77-23a-9(l) 
through (3), Utah Code Ann. (1982) , specifically provide tnat the 
information intercepted in such a manner may be disclosed while 
giving testimony and in the course of a police investigation. 
Because Ms. Guffey1s interception was lawful, her testimony may 
not be excluded under Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-7 (1982), which 
provides for exclusion ot tne communication or evidence derived 
therefrom only if disclosure would violate Chapter 23a. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction for first degree murder should be upheld. 
DATED this l_l day of August, 1987. 
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istice LORENZ delivered the opinion of the court: 
i appeal from his ju*y<*ir*al <;€kf**ActioB--ot* -tfcnr-ee -counts of«j**rder defendant 
*nando Zayas seeks a new trial based on the following co^t^uiions: <1> the 
ors were improperly questioned concerning their views on the death 
laity; <2) the State improperly utilized its peremptory challenges to 
:lude one Hispanic and fourteen out of fifteen blacks from the jury; <3> in 
>ning argument the State alluded to damaging evidence which was never 
;ablished at trial; <4) the trial court erroneously precluded the defendant 
>m presenting certain exculpatory evidence; <5) the defendant was precluded 
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>m impeaching a State witness with his prior record of supervision; <6)4be 
fc^^-^iMtt^erDuttsdJOc-iritr.pd^ce iwPfta^c^Uy^^ahanced testimony; <7) gruesom 
>tographs were unnecessarily shown to the jury; and (8) a cautionary defense 
>truction on eyewitness identification was refused. 
» affirm. 
le "following pBrtinent -mmdrnnee wag-adduced at defendant's trial. At about 
15 a.m. on July 2, 1983 Miguel Vargas, Luis Cuaresma, and Ruben Gutierrez 
e shot to death on the front porch of a two-flat building at 1438 West 
;alpa in Chicago. On the premises at the time of the shooting were Carlos 
gas, Julia Tiro, and Ruby Mateo. Carlos Vargas testified at trial that he 
I just emerged from the apartment onto the porch to join the victims when he 
Lrd a gunshot. He saw the defendant, whom he had known for six or seven 
ITS, shooting at the victims from the bottom of the steps. Carlos heard 
eral more shots and then returned inside, where he asked Ruby and Julia to 
1 the police. Carlos initially told the police that he had been in the 
chen and had not seen the shooting. He also admitted that on his 
;tructions Julia and Ruby told the police the same thing. Carios-teatifiad 
tt.iia d^d-oafc «*itialiy tell .4hft .-irutk t>#£aus# he feared for his family'%s 
©. He also testified that he and Miguel Vargas were members of the Insane 
nowns street gang whereas defendant was a member of the Disciples, 
ibsequently on July 13 Carlos told the police that he had seen the defendant 
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otmg at the victims. 
other eyewitness testifying for the State was Timothy McGovern. On the 
urrence date McGovern, then fourteen, lived across the street and two doors 
the east of the two-flat building. As he was walking home, at a point three 
>rs from his house, he saw two men leave a car and walk toward the two-flat. 
n he was two doors from home he heard a gunshot and saw the defendant firinj 
iun toward the porch of the two-flat. After four or five shots the defendan 
t north through a gangway. 
Govern also testified that out of fear he did not initially tell the police 
>ut what he saw. On August 16, 1983, McGovern's brother Thomas was shot 
aing into the McGovern home. When two police officers came to investigate 
it shooting, which Timothy thought might be related to the July 2 shooting, 
told them what he had seen on July 2. He subsequently identified the 
Pendant from a book of 150 to 200 photographs and then in a lineup. 
>corro Roldan testified that in 1979 he and the defendant were members of th 
tin Disciples street gang. In 1978 one of the victims in the cause, Miguel 
rgasf a member of another gang, killed a Latin Disciple named Ramon MChi Chi 
>quez. Trial evidence established that Vargas pled guilty to the killing in 
Juvenile Court proceeding. According to Roldan defendant had a tattoo on hi 
n stating "Chi Chi, rest in peace." 
\e evening after the shootings Roldan went to a party celebrating those 
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llings. There the defendant told him that he, Jose Rodriguez, Ricky Garcia, 
i an unnamed fourth person had picked up a car belonging to Jose's sister, 
mita, without her knowing about it. They then drove to the two-flat, where 
:endant, Garcia and Rodriguez shot the victims, using two .38 caliber guns 
i a .357. Afterward they ran though the gangway to the car, which they 
turned to its spot at Juanita's house. A State firearms expert subsequently 
>tified that the bullets recovered from the victims' bodies established that 
>y were shot with .38 caliber and .357 magnum weapons, 
i July 30, 1983 Roldan was hospitalized after being shot by another member o 
> Latin Disciples. During the investigation of that shooting Roldan told th 
Ace of defendant's admissions. Defendant subsequently visited Socorro at th< 
>pital. Police officers were secreted so as to overhear the conversation. 
*e record indicates that the conversation was taped but the tape was of poor 
Llity and the jury was not informed of it.) When Socorro asked about the 
pie murder defendant denied any involvement, but he did say that Jose 
Iriguez had been shot by Garcia during the incident. Defendant also told 
:orro to be quiet because somebody was "trickingM on him, an expression 
:orro understood to mean informing on him. Socorro believed that defendant 
lied any involvement because defendant believed Socorro was talking to the 
ice. 
t*krigfrr^>»ir~«kteiwer-^trfgcfetCTrr*Hfch^£tefre*-tt-i-so-feIicited testimony from • 
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^a9o~-Pufcii^'^i»c^lFVg^^ ,^htre^r€>cail* Had been- enhanced-Ahrougl 
Moesi<6. Out*.of *~*he~?urY'« -presef*w*he~oourt f i r s t . h e a r d the. testimony pf • 
>-hypnotists Dr. "Bennett 6. HBraunt BrauR%iasUf ied :4hat .-he-.vas a-
uchiat-ri-st-t-a d i rec tor .of the Aflrerican-Board of ^Hypnotists#_^nd a ^consultant 
Jy-tihe £oek -County -Sherrf-f^s Department, ~1iol<Jif>g the t i t l e of deputy 
>**f£. Braun t e s t i f i e d ^e*-ienfi*v«>4y*-com:eTTiifig £*s quai l f i x a t i o n s and the 
d e l i a e s h e followed m~knrpnoti*i*g~totb *ns tn -an attempt to avo»i<i problems a: 
lflest4on -and -confabulation *<f JJi4i»g-naU^**e*ocy -gaps *uth.4$agined r e c a l l > 
ooia*W~*±th hypnosis . Ih* ^co^ir^mtnd:.Brawn to be-hi-gbly qual i f ied, in .±be> 
l{d a.nd:Alsq found the State , u a s . n o t - ^ q u i r e d - t o e s t a b l i s h that hypnosis **as 
4#l-dL<>a&aoQ9in§ k feasonable degree of - s c i e n t i f i c c e r t a i n t y . D e t e c t i v e • 
JLi«.4Jien.-Jttetifiedt before the jury , .-.that a t .1:45 a#*a, on the aorning of ihi 
otirog ihc .-and -his partner-drove * to the shooting scene and ttwn continued 
.tb.9JL»Q~bJiGcks. A^J^flUt^luLe par.-wi^h f our * a l e ocoupanis pul led in f r o n t s 
*r QA^^Qf^ -rth^ , gasfrgftgerg Jcept Jooicing backhand Atkins looked b r i e f l y a t . 
.JUc«**se ^ l a t e . «J4fr-~€k4^wo* ^nrrte doim -ibe~ ra**ber becau*a;c4^ey ^ac^ been to\< 
±aok-~-4*>* <a car conta in ing it*o female -LatinsL**Hoi+e*ef'*ktt^htB? -returned t# 
—shooting scene Atkins -was to ld , tha t -a l i gh t binie tt^o-door^car might tfe 
t*lved. ThX&*&ou$dfc<i .ftjjQj.la.r.^to ihe car Atkins had paeii,f ^da&cnbed by:him ai 
-4«re**s A Aight-biue -oar , \probably a Plymouth Sebri&g* -^.tcense. jvumbej. XND 
&fi*r &e4*g.„ hypnotized At k ins reca l l ed the .car as.rbei*>g.a l i g h t blue, 
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,e «po4el tuuo-door Ponixact with chropi^Aiqund the jeax 4iUjxdQUt 4 red and taji 
ck&r *>*-the 4ricensa> p l a t e f * n d ike licex)$e number NXJ 402.. 
i a l ^vrd«rnoe ssrtabiiBhed that *the lac^nse p la te of .Juaruta Rodriguez's. <;are 
ch 4e£endaM-aileaed-lr ~s^ ±<i -t*as-«u&ed -i£_the shoot ing , was NXJ 240. Spcorrq, 
dan .had.^lsor-ta^fcififtd that he knew Jua*i^a'.s.£a4\.io*be a*I*ght.t>lVe, two-
•r ^©hl^Jhe. 
fendant presented an alibi defense. Angelo Ferrand, the step-father of 
endant's girl friend Latena, testified that defendant and Latena stayed a 
rand's Waukegan home from June 30 until July S. On July 1 he saw the 
endant at the Waukegan home in the evening before going to bed at midnight 
I also sam him the next morning at 9:00 a.m. 
>se Aviles, a cousin of Latena, testified that he drove defendant and 
e n a up to the Waukegan house on June 30, and they stayed until about July 
On July 1 he watched television with defendant until 1 or 2 a.m. and then 
i him again at 7:00 a.m. the next day. Luis Allendi, Latena's brother, als< 
'ed at the Waukegan house and testified that defendant and Latena were then 
oughout the holiday weekend, including July 1 and 2. 
>e defense also called Juanita Rodriguez. She denied even lending her car t< 
brother, Jose Rodriguez, in the month of July or any other time. The 
m n g of July 1 she had the car keys home with her. She saw her car at 6:30 
i. when her husband drove it home from work and again when she got up in the 
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ning at 9:00 a.m. 
4 IwM-rig^JTfry"r^fe^it!FeTattt>ns^t*e-f^fvrfaTTt-vas-convicted of three-cou?>t9 of -tntirdtfi 
I v a s ^ f f t e h o e i t t o "thr^e- corrcurr^nt terias of imprisonment . for DaJturaL.l-if^ 
"tootif par^l§ . 
NION 
1. 
ior to trial the State announced its intention to seek the death penalty, 
endant contends he was prejudiced when, despite his stated intention to 
ve his right to a jury at the death penalty stage of the proceedings, the 
al court permitted the State to question the jurors concerning their views 
the death penalty pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 
L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770. In Daley v. Hett (1986), 113 111.2d 75, 495 
.2d 513, our supreme court determined that a defendant could exercise such « 
trial waiver. However our supreme court has subsequently determined that 
ey does not apply retroactively, nor would the death-qualifying of a jury 
pite such a proper waiver prejudice a defendant. People v. Enckson 
87), # 59058,--111.2d , --N.E.2d . 
, 2. 
fendant, a Hispanic, also contends that the State improperly exercised its 
emptory challenges to exclude 14 of 15 blacks and the sole Hispanic from th« 
y in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), --U.S. , 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 10( 
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t.v 1712. The State initially contends that the record does not establish 
many blacks were on the jury, and it also*notes that a Hispanic alternate 
or was selected. In any event we find that under the express holding of 
son defendant lacks standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks from the 
y. The Batson court held that to establish such a case "the defendant must 
st show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, (citation 
tted), and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove 
m the venire members of the defendant's race/1 (--U.S. , , 106 S.Ct. 
2, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87, (emphasis added).> Although the Colorado 
reme Court recently ruled that a black defendant could challenge the 
lusion of Hispanics from the jury, that court did so on the basis of a Sixtt 
ndment and Colorado constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-
tion of the community. (Fields v (Colo. 1987), 732 P.2d 1145.) However the 
ted States Supreme Court has declined to extend the fair cross-section 
luirement to petit juries. (Loclchart v. McCree (1986), U.S. -9 -1 90 L.Ed.2d 
, # 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1765.) Accordingly, we find that defendant lacks 
nding to challenge the State's partial exclusion of blacks from this jury. 
also find no merit to defendant's claim that the elimination of a single 
panic from the jury necessitated a Batson hearing. The potential juror at 
ue stated during voir dire that she had a nephew currently in jail, a 
uation which she described as Mvery painful" to the family. She also statec 
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nephew persisted in associating with the same "group." Although she statec 
t she believed the courts were fair in his situation, we do not find that a 
son challenge to the State's peremptory challenge could reasonably be 
tamed. Accordingly, we find no basis for reversal on this ground. 
3. 
fendant also contends that in opening argument the State twice improperly 
uded to incriminating evidence which was then not introduced at trial. In 
instance the State informed the jury that defendant had vowed revenge 
inst one of the victims, Miguel Vargas, because Vargas killed defendant's 
end, Ramon MChi ChiM Vasquez. As we have noted, at trial the State did 
ablish that defendant told Soccoro Roldan that Vargas had killed Chi Chi anc 
t defendant had a tattoo stating "Chi Chi, rest in peace/' However the 
rt then barred the State from eliciting from Roldan, himself a former membei 
the Latin Disciples, that a gang membpr seeking revenge for a slaying would 
e the slain member's name tattooed on himself. Clearly there was no 
iberate misconduct by the State on this issue, nor did this openmg-argiunenl 
tement substantially prejudice the defendant, given the eyewitness testimoni 
ch directly implicated him in this crime. Accordingly we find no reversibh 
or arising from this comment. People v. Platter (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 803, 
N.E.2d 181. 
ere is no merit to the second opening-argument comment objected to by 
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endant. The State told the jury that while in the hospital Socorro Roldan 
told by defendant of the involvement of his two fellow gang members but 
Id not admit his own involvement. As our earlier summary of Roldan's 
timony establishes, this statement by the State was a substantially accurate 
ount of Roldan's testimony on this point. 
4. 
fendant next contends that on several occasions the trial court improperly 
red defense evidence. In the first such instance the defense was barred 
m introducing evidence concerning the gun used in the shooting of Timothy 
overn's brother Thomas, six weeks after the shootings at issue here. That 
was subsequently destroyed, apparently mistakenly, by the police 
artment. Defendant contends that he should have been permitted to present 
se facts to the jury in order to establish a police conspiracy to destroy 
sibly exculpatory evidence. We find that the court properly exercised its 
cretion to bar the presentation of such speculative evidence. (People v. 
on (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 522, 453 N.E.2d 849.) The subsequent testimony by 
tate firearms expert was that it was not very probable that any of the 
lets recovered from the three victims came from the same type of weapon 
olved in the McGovern shooting. Under these circumstances we find no abuse 
discretion in the trial court's ruling, 
e defendant also sought to call two witnesses who would have testified 
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cerning possible motives by others to kill the victims. One of the 
tnesses, Harry Ramirez, would have testified that one or two days before the 
Doting one of the victims threatened Ramirez and a second person with a gun, 
B second witness, Jimmy Torrez, would have testified that he witnessed the 
lying of Ramon "Chi Chi" Vasquez by Miguel Vargas, one of the victims in thi 
se. At that time Vargas also fired two shots at Torres. Neither of these 
tnesses was connected in any manner with the shootings at issue and again we 
nd that the court properly barred this speculative evidence, 
i the final instance of precluded testimony the defense had unsuccessfully 
ight to obtain a continuance in order to secure the appearance of Frank 
rnef a subpoenaed witness who failed to appear on the required date. In the 
*sence of counsel for defendant and the State the court telephoned the 
tness, who suffered from multiple sclerosis. Byrne told the court that he 
i fallen and did not know whether he could appear the next court day, which 
xld come after a weekend recess. Byrne's doctor also told the court that it 
s very doubtful Byrne could get to court under any circumstances. 
ie defense had represented that Byrne would testify that he lived on Gregory 
reet, north across the alley from the two-flat and that he heard shots 
tween 1:30 and 1:45 early on the morning in question and saw two men run 
rth across Gregory into a schoolyard and then further north. However the 
tness told the court over the telephone that he only saw one man. In any 
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?nt given the unlikely possibility that the witness would have been able to 
stify and the failure of the defense to establish the vital nature of this 
>timony we find no error in the denial of the continuance. People v. Rivera 
578), 64 Ill.App.3d 49, 380 N.E.2d 1018. 
5. 
*fendant next contends that he should have been permitted to impeach State 
tness Carlos Vargas with a prior disposition of supervision received by 
rgas on a theft charge. Our supreme court has held that the successful 
apletion of a period of supervision does not result in a conviction and thus 
not a proper basis for impeachment. (People v. Schuning (1985), 106 111.2d 
, 476 N.E.2d 423.) Absent a showing that Vargas' supervisionary period was 
t successfully completed and resulted in an actual conviction, we find the 
ial court's ruling to be proper. 
» next consider dfc^rfdamt^'cfonYeTrt iotf t+mt -the t**al court erred when-it 
ifrrtt^ tf ttre hypndtfcally^cFnhranced testimony of Officer Atkins concerning the 
isase-prtatte'^ tiflrttef of the vehicle he saw 2 1/2 blocks from the shooting, 
us contention i*a***^ a ~i*gai issue whtch has not been determined by. the 
ii4wx&.«^refte ceur*, whebtw* iyyspno^H-caiiy^enhanced testimony*should be 
>M&©ifelo IT* f m * 6 i s courts. Jf^J^c^U .v*J4*4so» (1987)
 f 116 111.2d 29/ 
[.2d t the cQurLiflgec^AGally^aseT*^ 
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» daMQ&£%^4&bereM 4m~*4h&*&&~tf'nkyfm^ The 
*t«*«as.&f ^ the 'Hliftois appe 1 i ate -court- on this issue are conflicting. As 
)63. in fi*ofr1yy% Harom^t^SSSt. 111 Wi^pp.eti 204, 250 N.E.2d 5, 
jourth District) of this court indicated in dicta that hyfljioyiff_-vg.c Pgf 
£***^ltoi^*i**Jplx> tft fl1ln,tl **F use in a criminal prosecution. fiui.ifrP* 
>**^*«*™^^ a^>y£7S>, 68 Ul,flpp.3d 379, 385 N.E.2d848f 
Lt s — .district i4»SM*d H*nat -fwia-ins -the Leading 141 lnoijt-casj* -suppor£ing 
h*»e iojn <of m*ch *«v*d*n<re. THer^^n State tutaess *tas permitted to testify 
I«MP**J>8 a*identification of the defendant that she was able to -make only 
:*r~+je1tmq*4*fp7ioti ted1. The reviewing court, uith one justice dissenting, 
md this evidence to be properly-admitted because it-found certain guideline! 
*raet< the "hypnotist lias competent, suggest ion was not used in the-
*io«*s* -the •'Identification was corroborated by other evidence, and the 
;n#$s &*d an ample opportunity to vieu the defendant at the time of thfe 
sttrrenca; In. "so .he ld fngthe ^oourt -re 1 led , mter^4-»a , en Harding v - Stafrp 
368), W W . 4pp. 230, 246 A.2d 302, since.-overruled by State v. Co l l ins 
383), 2S6 ttd..S7e, 464 A.2d 1028. The court a l s o .erroneously suggested >,that 
*hat t i n e no Jur i sd i c t i on bafred hypnotically-enhanced testimony. (See Jone 
State (Okla. Crim. 1975), 542 P.2d 1316; Greenfield v. Commonwealth 
374), 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 . ) The court alsq.x>rjAy.br4elly. al luded- to 
a-probtems a s s o c i a t e d with .hypnosis-, including Vf-antasyVlconfabulatl©*) and 
COPR. <C> WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO 0RIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
> Copy R 1 OF 1 P 14 OF 22 IL-CS P 
*S***tbl*rtr; 68 I l l .App.3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853. 
i B«i|rfa:^L.-.jG.ib9on (1983) , 117 Jlk.-App,3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368, the Sputth. . 
Kt»*«l -0taf firmed . i t s .holding in :S»relra», uhjJe. acknowledging t h a t . a number 
. j u r i s d i c t i o n s had, si-nce the d e c i s i o n - i n Smrekar, barred hypnoticall*y-
»««e*d-©»yidence\ Jhe S»reJ»ar -guide l ines approach was adopted by the Thud 
/*^ion -of -ftbe -First Dis tr i f t t . (Peopie -v* Jordap (1983) , 120 I l l .App.3d 836, 
J N.E.2d 1115.) In Veapi*-*.; .8yas (1983) , 117 I l l .App.3d 979, 453 N.E.2d 
!l1, the H j i r d . I h s t r i c t . indicated .in .d ic ta that it . too would fol low Smrekar. 
i Fi/-th d i s t r i c t genera l l y adopted the Smrekar -approach, i e People v . Cohoon 
383), 120 I l l .App.3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998. But.**thout d i r e c t l y ^deciding tfce 
**e--©-f the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of hypnotical ly-enhanced evidence o u x s u p r e m e c ©41/1 
mr&eii the Cohoon -decis idn. (People v. Cohoon (1984) , 104 irT72d'295, "472 
:.2d 403 . ) That reversal was based cm-the c o u r t ' s determination that in^any 
wit -the . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a t i s s u e , made immediately af ter hypnosis , « a s 
>er»ts«ibly s u g g e s t i v e . The court noted .the ri.sk of confabulation as well a 
iai testimony indicat ing that<-* hypn&ttit carmot d i s t i n g u i s h - t r u t h from 
vfabalation *ln* a subjeo t . Cit ing* inter a l i a , - th i s same Tisk af 
^tabulation the couft^also determined that the .^subsequent in - cou / t 
in t i f teat ion was not independently based. 
Fter the supreme c o u r t ' s Cohoon dec i s i on the f i f t h {Dis tr ic t , i n People A/. 
* * t * (1985) , 133 I l l .App.3d 639, 479 N.E.2d 355, he ld- that t h e - t r i a l "court 
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*p€Frly"*e*cltided testimony -by.a c l i n i c a l psycho log i s t that while under<3i^in^T 
>TK»is the de~f endant ?>onverbal ly denied committing the of f enses vu YJ^SLM. 
•sfi'oh. The appe-Hatycu a i t '"tfrs t fttguTshed those I l l i n o i s cases which have & 
nit ted hypnotically-enhanced testimony, no4<4nq tha4 «*he'«egmoe-before -ft^-
**4v«d*««^^e«c«a^ttct!t«fdvfrorm-"=a mfttte^s -while %t i-Hl Hinder-hyfm©s»is*. But the 
ir t ai sir *g^ngratty"t^o"unoK "hVpncs^ 'S—t-o -»«rtif feT---*T<o«m--*he- *ame• ^ def i-e*enc *es-^s 
hr3T*ph~**r«lF»s -and^TtrttHsertfniFlndttced ev-idenee. Motine that- ifl S*hean the 
l i n o i s supreme court had expressed, doubts oonoersung t h e . s c i e n t i f i c 
sa^tatrii. i ty *>f hypnosis the* duck e f t cdurt he ld that the evidence in question, 
»jg_r©pe«- ly . re j e c t e d . 
*e' d u w t n t - s tate -of the l a w - o n t h t s point in-other j u r i s d i c t i o n s i s a l so J^ n 
rflict, although- a c l e a r "trend, has developed. A 4 e v - / 4 i r i s d i c t i o p s have 
termined that hypnotically-enhanced testimony i s general ly admissible-, .**4tk> 
K»»e*ght'*'f-such evidence l e f t to the f a c t - f indens. (S ta te v. Wren (La. ».,, 
13)., 425 So.2d 756; S ta te v. Commeau (Me. 1981), 438 A.2d 454; State v. o&» 
>wn (N.D. 1983) , 337 N.W.2d 138; State v. Glebock (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) 
I S.W.2d 897; Chapman v. State (Wyo. 1982), 638 P.2d 1280; Clay v. Vose 
it Cir . 1984) , 771 F.2d 1; U.S. v . Awkard (9th Cir. 1979) , 597 F.2d 6 6 7 . ) ^ 
>e.^»ri'«(iw>tAono-f»«Ti»44-.«»*K?hr«uXde.w;e .pnly A»hexa g u i d e l i n e * .concerning 3J* M[ 
l i a b i l i t y Are mef. (S ta te v . Iwakiri C1984). 106 Idaho"618, 682 P.2d 571 {Of3! 
Lse v. S tate (Miss . 1984), 445 So.2d 815; State v. Hurd (1981) , 86 N.J. 5251 
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> A.2d 86; State v. Beachum (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 
\\ Or. Rev. S t a t . (1985) , s 136.675; Vester v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) 
I S.W.2d 715, a f f ' d on other grounds (Tex. Crim. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 920; 
kins v. Commonwealth (1985), 230 Va. 280, 337 S.E.2d 264; State v. 
strong (1983), 110 Wis.2d 55, 329 N.W.2d 386; U.S. v. Valdez (5th Cir. 
4), 722 F,2d 1196; U.S. v. Kimberlin (7th Cir. 1986), 805 F.2d 210, cert, 
ding 86-6445; Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp. (8th Cir. 1985), 771 
d 1112.) lk4.^>a~«M9.F«toltfci«g -majoarrty -©f^  •}artsd4ctions %riuch have 
s MJ**e4 4hri-» issue -bar ••fTOw the ~cx>u?-tT«oji* amy hypnot ica 1 ly^enhancori VO^ 
-Mworry*,' Contreras v. State (Alaska 1986), 718 P.2d 129; State v. Mena ^ 
81), 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274; R»dc~v^-S4a4^-U98&i».^gS-4Uk^566t..7.a8 
w2d<*JQ,t***'*<l- i^safar-^e^-Kafr-kai* e*tended to a. ^ efeRdant'*. (4-esti«»ony JLJjjLje 
R4-S87->^ ttotrr-eGr.l30,--ii.-S-». -2 1.rEd.2d, S.Ctv<»rai4*b-le * n w ^ | *387y *>t\ 
iS^v£«wfed.ai-braryr-OS #44e^; People v. Shirley (1982) ,*"3V Cai: 3d 18, 641 
6 775 (except for a defendant's own testimony); People v. Quintanar (Colo. 
. 1982), 659 P.2d 710; State v. Atwood (1984), 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2c 
; State v. Davis (Del. Super. 1985), 490 A.2d 601; Bundy v. State (Fla. 
5), 471 So.2d 9; Walraven v. State (1985), 255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E.2d 798; 
te v. Moreno (Hawaii 1985), 709 P.2d 103; Strong v. State (Ind. 1982), 435 
.2d 969; State v. Seager (Iowa 1983), 341 N.W.2d 420; State v. Haislip 
85), 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 775; State v. Collins (1983), 296 Md. 670, 464 
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d 1028; Commonwealth v. Kater (1983), 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190; 
pie v. Gonzales (1982), 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743, modified on other 
unds (1983), 417 Mich. 1129, 336 N.W.2d 751; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980), 
N.W.2d 764; Alsbach v. Bader (Mo. 1985), 700 S.W.2d 823; State v. Palmer 
81), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648; People v. Hughes (1983), 59 N.Y.2d 523, 
N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255; State v. Peoples (1984). 311 N.C. 515, 319 
.2d 177; State v. Weston (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 279, 475 N.E.2d 805; Jones 
State (Ok la. Crim. App. 1975), 542 P.2d 1316; Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch 
81), 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170; State v. Martin (1984), 101 Wash. 2d 713, 
P.2d 651. 
Kr^caftUB^Jsedy-cf mrthwrty V€r|eicttng*'the "courtrcwn use of..hypnotical ly-
anced Jes-tiJtony is -*iso~ reflected =ii» the 4egal and scientific literature. 
' 'Bernard l_. Diamond, a clinical professor of psychiatry, has exhaustively 
mined the problem associated with hypnosis of prospective witnesses. 
vrif*- «fch* lU^-af Pretrial Hypnosis ^>TV a~ Prospective 
&*&^< 68 Calif. L. Rev. 313 (1980).) Among the problems he identiTies are 
following. Hypnotized subjects commonly seek to please their questioners, 
the extent that they will commonly confabulate, filling in missing details 
h fantasy. Even experienced hypnosis experts cannot determine whether 
notically-enhanced recall is reliable and valid. Diamond notes that even 
cificity and richness of detail does not mean the memory is accurate; such 
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arent recall can be the product of confabulation. Thus Diamond cites one 
dy in which hypnotized subjects were asked to project themselves ten years 
0 the future. These subjects then purported to describe their future 
roundings in great detail. Diamond also notes that because of the 
ghtened suggestibility of hypnotic subjects the implanting of suggestion 
not be avoided. The very context and purpose of the hypnosis can be 
gestive, and a hypnotist with knowledge of the facts of a case may 
onsciously cue the subject concerning these facts. According to Diamond 
n videotaping an entire hypnosis session may not reveal all possible 
gestiveness because events preceding and following the hypnosis become 
egrated with the hypnotic experience, distorting the validity of the 
ject's recall. Diamond summarized his views as follows. 
1 believe that once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose 
enhancing memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is 
dered effectively incompetent to testify. Hypnotized persons, being 
remely suggestible, graft onto their memories fantasies or suggestions 
l iberate ly or unwitt ingly communicated by the hypnotist* After hypnosis the 
>ject cannot d i f f e r e n t i a t e between a true r e c o l l e c t i o n and a fantasy or a 
jgested d e t a i l . Neither can any expert or the t r i e r of f a c t . This risk i s 
g r e a t , in my view, that the use of hypnosis by p o l i c e on a po tent ia l witnes 
tantamount to the des truct ion or fabr ica t ion of ev idence . * « *<Even under 
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ringent safeguards, including presentat ion to the t r i e r of f ac t of the 
l l e s t p o s s i b l e information on the e f f e c t s of hypnosis , the t r i e r w i l l not be 
le to sor t out r e a l i t y from witness fantasy and weigh t h i s testimony 
>perly." 68 C a l i f . L . Rev. 313, 314-15. 
more recent survey of the s c i e n t i f i c community's view of t h i s i s sue a l s o 
»arly supports exc lus ion of such evidence . (Ni»t*i J i ia l -by -Jranga^JLte 
t—UAflfcJu3 The author notes that a f ter what he descr ibes as an exhaust ive 
/iew of the s c i e n t i f i c research on hypnosis and memory the Council on 
t e n t i f i c Af fa irs of the American Medical Assoc iat ion concluded that hypnosis 
>uld not be used to prepare wi tnesses for t r i a l . He a l s o c i t e s research 
>wing that: hypnotized subjec t s respond incorrect ly to leading quest ions 
Lee as of ten as non-hypnotized s u b j e c t s ; f a l s e memories from hypnotic recal 
f a c t u a l l y replace the o r i g i n a l memory; hypnosis does not improve f a c i a l 
s n t i f i c a t i o n and may f a c i l i t a t e f a l s e p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ; hypnosis 
as not improve the accuracy of r e c a l l but does s i g n i f i c a n t l y increase the 
e j e c t ' s confidence in the r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
^ * f e 4 ^ ^ # a 4 i 4 * g ie*ptMr±*~dai -±it*s^f-*eid~4^^0f V^Har t t n -firac ,-.+b3.Tt*ooiwBe«^ejd 
vdeIknpo jfotTitm^axtoTGgvn*:of 4rypniptrcaliy^^nihaTTced^iestimony. were adopted.Jb 
» 4te*'-^*w~j*j#*4M€> COUF4 ^p People y . 4iurd
 #<1982) , 86 N.J. 525,' 432 A.2d -
. B^V^whs^o^tt t iy- /*^ £3hri»^haw-ctet«r»ined Jthat hypnatically^^bance*! 
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*tij*Gf!t-*£'~Twrt-teitf^l«r^n^jrfK>uld ^o-t -be f>ermitted a^wtri*! . Arae
 T o i ^ U f 
^^^tttmii^JEmhtc^d^fastiiiOTiy^i in £ye*U*R**s-.IesU«K>nyu:,,r Psychological*. 
»p#c4*-resHi44^44« <M^-U^Tre<J*4e.r4984) f . p* -171 f 2iU - c i t e d in People ~v« 
• k u r ^ t d f t * * ^ ? . • Carter** -3B& ,—*?&& *€A\*>*P*t\ 4 6 2 , r*$fi Pv2d €35*--6GG-ei. 
ased on a l l these a u t h o r i t i e s ne^OfwJl.u(Je ifclwfct* JUUFUWS* AiM$-the~xd&$>T 
iirrsti^^f^frtfcer/^XTimdlctions -in _tJ^«*coAmiry,-sbpuld not ^generally perttit 
e~c«w±TW^'tis* of hyprtotix»Hv-ef4iaHced evidence because of the fundamental 
pbX**,^<<«iiafcl4ity- Iffteffcnt 'in sueh. testimony*. Because .ear-stiprefie court 
r\*i-«»dy' thrtermiTOcf Hvat witnesses-may t e s t i f y concerning the ir f>reH^ypnoti 
oo l i^c t ionsY «* would tiote 'that* t h i s comprehensive approach w i l l provide 
ztecttamr+Ttm mfcerently unre l iab le - te s t imony trhi le ? t 1 l i permit t ing the use 
iiyptmslB <&s ^n Inves t ina t ive too1 . (See Harnish, Hypnotically Refreshed 
stimony: In Support of the Emerging Majority and People v . Hughes 453 N.E.2 
4 <N.Y.1983) f 33 Buff.L.R. 417 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . ) Q&.*Mi-i*t8'4**9**Qt **t**d to :*h* 
w^mo^.^^^-^^n^T^i. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has recently ruled 
at d e s p i t e the r e l i a b i l i t y problems inherent in hypnotically-enhanced 
stijoony, a defendant 's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight to t e s t i f y bars s t a t e s from 
opting a per s e rule excluding a l l such testimony by a defendant. (Beafc^. 
*aiij4**« Jmm 2&r*98??mt?EXIS -Getffftd T f t f a t y , VS f l l ^ T ) This cause does 
t involve such testimony by a defendant and we leave for another day the 
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es t ion of how I l l i n o i s w i l l accommodate a defendant's r ight to t e s t i f y in 
ch circumstances. , ' 
Hifrwmsft i f hJHifr rf»r»n*'i W»PI i rti*» Lkim l i f f n i \ ^ ^lly-ffph^n^e^ jtestimony j>f 
fc*fi<HP JUk*m+~ »h»»i<±^»i i w J » a a <*0£4M.4£adft ^a^ a u f t ' t l i i i l l ;4#iermin^ijhethei 
J*&L*utu**+ > f w ) i ^ r c E g - b j T ' f W r e W l t t e E c g ^ ^ ^ d f t y ^ j ^ ^ no*-free* -held 
k»^er-^:*#*ers4i>l«- (K**g * v £ U t e *Lnd« 1984X^60 N,E*2d~-347;
 r Stat*_v,. 
ocorrtai* <T98Q); *25 ftrlti' 547; *£H J>.:2d 5514) / Jhe testimony at issue 4id 
^r^We^ny-i^ent if ication 4of "the ftefendan-t artd.tierely .corroborated otber 
plfihr ^ rvi^efrc* presented by -**fve State concerning ^he <^ ar *hix:h -defendant 
*Q€tdiy*&&*&~£h -th*<rtiter The State presented eyewitness testimony by two 
nesses identifying defendant as one of those who shot at the victims. One 
those two witnesses had known the defendant for years. The State also 
sented testimony by a third witness that defendant admitted his 
ticipation in the shootings.
 %Giv*P«jtJw -fiatm* t>f^tMs '¥vft!e~ticS£Ve"a.re t»t 
p*«te#~that -**ef •trdattt -was pfejuJiced by the hypnotical Ly-^enhanced evidence 
oh-mmsmiv^jMtlated *fco a-inscription of the-car se£n blocks away-frx>m the 
pt-^ctne. ftcc<?r4>^al-y.H^.wjt.llv5ot;reverse r$n tkisjflrouxttJ. 
though defendant contends that certain photographs of the victims were 
ecessarily gruesome and should not have been shown to the jury, defendant 
failed to include those photographs on appeal and we will not consider the 
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ue further. We would only note that ordinarily such matters are within the 
siderable discretion of the trial court. People v. Hayes (1979), 70 
.APp.3d 811, 388 N.E.2d 818. 
8. 
e final contention we consider is that the court should have given the jury 
endant's non-IPI instruction concerning guidelines for evaluating eyewitness 
ntification testimony. The Committee on Jury Instructions recommends that 
separate instruction be given on identification evidence and that the mattei 
left to final argument. (Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 
5 <2d ed. 1981).) We find no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal of 
s instruction. People v. Hefner (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 693f 368 N.E.2d 1059 
r the reasons set forth in this opinion we affirm the defendant's 
ILLIVAN, P.J. and MURRAY, J., concur. 
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